They emailed me a PDF. It opened fine with evince and looked like a simple doc at first. Then I clicked on a field in the form. Strangely, instead of simply populating the field with my text, a PDF note window popped up so my text entry went into a PDF note, which many viewers present as a sticky note icon.
If I were to fax this PDF, the PDF comments would just get lost. So to fill out the form I fed it to LaTeX and used the overpic pkg to write text wherever I choose. LaTeX rejected the file… could not handle this PDF. Then I used the file
command to see what I am dealing with:
$ file signature_page.pdf
signature_page.pdf: Java serialization data, version 5
WTF is that? I know PDF supports JavaScript (shitty indeed). Is that what this is? “Java” is not JavaScript, so I’m baffled. Why is java in a PDF? (edit: explainer on java serialization, and some analysis)
My workaround was to use evince to print the PDF to PDF (using a PDF-building printer driver or whatever evince uses), then feed that into LaTeX. That worked.
My question is, how common is this? Is it going to become a mechanism to embed a tracking pixel like corporate assholes do with HTML email?
I probably need to change my habits. I know PDF docs can serve as carriers of copious malware anyway. Some people go to the extreme of creating a one-time use virtual machine with PDF viewer which then prints a PDF to a PDF before destroying the VM which is assumed to be compromised.
My temptation is to take a less tedious approach. E.g. something like:
$ firejail --net=none evince untrusted.pdf
I should be able to improve on that by doing something non-interactive. My first guess:
$ firejail --net=none gs -sDEVICE=pdfwrite -q -dFIXEDMEDIA -dSCALE=1 -o is_this_output_safe.pdf -- /usr/share/ghostscript/*/lib/viewpbm.ps untrusted_input.pdf
output:
Error: /invalidfileaccess in --file--
Operand stack:
(untrusted_input.pdf) (r)
Execution stack:
%interp_exit .runexec2 --nostringval-- --nostringval-- --nostringval-- 2 %stopped_push --nostringval-- --nostringval-- --nostringval-- false 1 %stopped_push 1990 1 3 %oparray_pop 1989 1 3 %oparray_pop 1977 1 3 %oparray_pop 1833 1 3 %oparray_pop --nostringval-- %errorexec_pop .runexec2 --nostringval-- --nostringval-- --nostringval-- 2 %stopped_push --nostringval-- --nostringval-- --nostringval-- %array_continue --nostringval--
Dictionary stack:
--dict:769/1123(ro)(G)-- --dict:0/20(G)-- --dict:87/200(L)-- --dict:0/20(L)--
Current allocation mode is local
Last OS error: Permission denied
Current file position is 10479
GPL Ghostscript 10.00.0: Unrecoverable error, exit code 1
What’s my problem? Better ideas? I would love it if attempts to reach the cloud could be trapped and recorded to a log file in the course of neutering the PDF.
(note: I also wonder what happens when Firefox opens this PDF, because Mozilla is happy to blindly execute whatever code it receives no matter the context.)
Don’t quote me on this, but I don’t think PDFs can usually contain java. It also wouldn’t execute if you don’t have a java runtime.
Either way, java serialization data is not executable, it is just that: data. It doesn’t contain code. You need the matching code already running in order to de-serialize the data.
If your file matches the linked SO post, you don’t have serialized java data embedded in the pdf, but the pdf embedded in a serialized java array. Which, also according to the SO post, is not a valid pdf.
<speculation>
I would assume that the library that generated this file (in the SO case Apache FOP) has a bug where it accidentally serializes the memory array (that holds the generated pdf) to the disk, instead of writing it to the disk. Why do pdf readers open it anyway? Either they incorrectly scan the file for%PDF-
instead of verifying these are the first bytes, or the apache library (and possibly other libraries with similar bugs) are or were common enough that accepting this became reasonable.
</speculation>